Are these patterns necessary, or generated boilerplate?

A few things on the new models look possibly over-engineered — can you confirm each is intentional?

• __repr__ redaction ([REDACTED]) is added to the new passkey models, but existing secret-bearing models in this same file (TokenSet, MfaVerifyResponse — both hold access_token / refresh_token / id_token) have no such redaction. Either we adopt redaction project-wide or drop it here for consistency; having it only on the new models is inconsistent.
• @model_validator (_check_at_least_one_method) here — is this a real requirement or speculative validation?
• model_config = ConfigDict(populate_by_name=True) — what's the reason this is needed on these models? If nothing populates by field name (vs alias), it can be removed.
• EnrollAuthenticationMethodRequest.type is a free-form str while this file already uses Literal[...] for closed sets (AuthenticatorType, OobChannel, etc.). type (and preferred_authentication_method, which the spec restricts to sms/voice) could be Literal so bad values fail at construction instead of as a remote API error.
• Minor: the enroll/verify docstrings say create:me:authentication_methods (underscore); the spec scope uses a hyphen — create:me:authentication-methods.

1. __repr__ redaction - I have not made any changes to pre existing patterns to avoid accidentaly breaking code in a large PR. Though I feel the redaction should be there in all cases. It does not cost us anything rather its a better approach in terms of security.
2. @model_validator (_check_at_least_one_method) This was added for better clarity on the error rather than a generic 400 for better DX. However, this breaks push notifications - Removed it.
3. model_config = ConfigDict(populate_by_name=True) - Copy paste mistake. Since it does not break anything this did not get caught in tests.
4. EnrollAuthenticationMethodRequest.type - Added literals.
5. Updated the underscore to hyphens .

Two DPoP gaps:

1. DPoPAuth has no DPoP-Nonce handling. Auth0/Okta commonly responds 401 + a DPoP-Nonce header and expects the proof retried with that nonce, so the first call against a nonce-requiring resource server will fail. Can we track nonce-retry even if it's deferred past GA?
2. Separately, signin_with_passkey does a plain token POST with no DPoP proof, and PasskeyTokenResponse.token_type defaults to Bearer, but the Test Plan says /oauth/token (webauthn) returns Bearer or DPoP based on tenant setup. If the tenant issues a DPoP-bound token, the SDK ends up holding a token bound to a key it never used. Can we confirm the GA scope for DPoP-bound passkey tokens?

Tests for methods that live in server_client.py should be added to test_server_client.py as a new section that mirrors the existing test patterns in that file (same fixtures, mocker.patch("httpx.AsyncClient.post", ...) / auth=ANY style). This file uses a different mocking idiom (patching _get_http_client with a hand-built async context manager) than the rest of the suite. let's keep it consistent.

Also note: the connect-account methods in my_account_client.py were reshaped alongside the formatting pass - please confirm no behavior changed there.

Let's not introduce feature-scoped test files (test_passkey_my_account.py, test_passkey_server_client.py) at this point. We can keep using the existing test_my_account_client.py and test_server_client.py until we have a concrete reason to split files. Please fold these tests into the existing files.

Please pull these up to a module/class-level constant rather than constructing them in the middle of the method body, consistent with how the rest of the client references endpoints.

These three methods implement the passkey login/signup ceremony: passkey_signup_challenge / passkey_login_challenge (step 1: get auth_session + the WebAuthn challenge), then the app runs navigator.credentials.create/get, then signin_with_passkey (step 2 :exchange the signed credential for tokens via the webauthn grant). Two questions:

1. Can you confirm this is the intended end-to-end flow and that all three methods are exercised by it?
2. signin_with_passkey returns a PasskeyTokenResponse but, unlike complete_interactive_login, never persists to the state store or creates a session. Is that intentional (caller owns the session), or should passkey sign-in integrate with the SDK's existing session/state handling like every other login path here?

For an RWA SDK whose value-add is session/state management, returning bare tokens reads as an inconsistency.

These if <field> is not None: user_profile[...] = <field> assignments are manually replicating what Pydantic gives for free. If we model user_profile as a typed sub-model on a request object (e.g. PasskeySignupChallengeOptions), this whole block reduces to:

if options.user_profile:                                                                                                                                                               
      body["user_profile"] = options.user_profile.model_dump(exclude_none=True) 

exclude_none=True preserves the current "omit unset keys" behavior, and each field gets real typing instead of an untyped Optional[str] kwarg.

We can use ConfigDict(extra="allow") to the sub-model also which will allow new profile fields pass through without touching this method.

This can be moved here

Consider a dedicated PasskeyError(Auth0Error) class (mirroring CustomTokenExchangeError) instead of ApiError with a passkey_challenge_error string code, so callers can catch the type directly.

When we catch an unexpected error here (like a network timeout) and re-raise it as an ApiError, the original error gets hidden, the caller only sees "Passkey signup challenge failed" and can't tell it was actually a connection problem. Adding from e (raise ApiError(...) from e) keeps the original error linked in the traceback so it's still debuggable.

Same applies to the equivalent line in passkey_login_challenge and signin_with_passkey.